É bem conhecida a oposição estabelecida por Kant entre experiência possível e dialética, na medida em que esta última é caracterizada como a “lógica da ilusão”. Ao mesmo tempo, o modo de pensar metafísico, que ocorre dialeticamente, em sentido kantiano, é uma tendência inevitável da razão, expressa na exigência formal de completude das categorias. Como o pensar, enquanto exercício livre da razão, é em si mesmo mais amplo do que a atividade de conhecer, própria do entendimento, o pensar contém o (...) conhecimento, embora este se qualifique pelas regras e pelos limites determinantes da objetividade. A pergunta que tentaremos formular é se essa relação continente-conteúdo não poderia configurar também uma dependência da experiência em relação ao raciocínio dialético, que estaria de algum modo indicada na função reguladora das idéias da razão. Nesse caso, a oposição formal entre conhecer e pensar seria inseparável da inclusão estrutural (dependência) da experiência no âmbito da razão. Na raiz do problema estaria talvez a tensão (dialética) entre a aspiração subjetiva de totalidade e as exigências objetivas de limitação e segmentação da experiência e a forma da experiência teria de ser finalmente concebida a partir de um fundo de inteligibilidade problemática. Dialectics and experienceThe separation of possible experience as objective knowledge and dialetics as a non-objective or non-theoretical knowledge is one of the most important aspects of kantian critical philosophy. But Kant also says that the activity of reason, as a pure thinking, has more amplitude than understanding knowledge. So we could say that theoric knowledge would depend on rational ( and non-theoretical) knowledge, as something contained in it. If we accept that, the consequence would be a relation of dependence between the form of objective knowledge and the background of a problematic – even doubtful – inteligible knowledge. (shrink)

David E. Cooper; I*—The Presidential Address: Analytical and Continental Philosophy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, P.

Edited by leading experts in contemporary environmental philosophy, this anthology features the best available selections that cover the full range of positions within this rapidly developing field. Divided into four sections that delve into the vast issues of contemporary Eco-philosophy, the Fourth Edition now includes a section on Continental Environmental Philosophy that explores current topics such as the social construction of nature, and eco-phenomenology. Each section is introduced and edited by a leading philosopher in the field. For professionals with (...) a career within the environmental field including law, politics, conservation, geography, and biology. (shrink)

On the political nature of the analytic - continental distinction in professional philosophy and the general tendency to discredit continental philosophy while redesignating the rubric as analytically conceived.

THE NATURE OF ART is a collection of 29 seminal, historically-organized readings that are focused on a basic philosophical question: What is Art? Including writings from the Western tradition'both Continental and Analytic traditions'as well as non-Western, minority, and feminist writings, this volume provides students with a rich set of resources to explore this matter both broadly and deeply. Introductions to each reading situate the selection amidst each respective thinker's body of work and the greater philosophical context in which the (...) remarks arose. Reading questions accompany each selection, drawing students' attention to key points to be encountered. Hailed by reviewers and adopters for its clarity and rigor, Wartenberg's THE NATURE OF ART offers a lively and engaging introduction to the philosophy of art. (shrink)

The thought that empathy plays an important role in moral motivation is almost a platitude of contemporary folk psychology. Parallel themes were mooted in German moral philosophy and aesthetics in the 1700s, and versions of the empathy construct remained prominent in continental accounts of moral motivation through the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. This chapter elucidates the Empathic Motivation Hypothesis (EMH) and sets out some of the conceptual and empirical challenges it faces. It distinguishes empathic concern from other (...) dimensions of empathy (e.g., resonance, attunement, distress, and non-empathic concern) and examines the merits of EMH as a developmental thesis, focusing on evidence from psychopathology and attachment theory. (shrink)

To English readers certain parts of Gadamer’s Truth and Method are reminiscent of the later works of R. G. Collingwood. The expectation that Gadamer might agree with Collingwood’s view of history is suggested by the fact that Gadamer, as he tells us himself, was responsible for some of Collingwood’s works being translated into German. But Gadamer’s general assessment of Collingwood proves to be a negative one: he finds lapses and contradictions that lead him to criticize Collingwood’s conception of historical understanding. (...) I think that Gadamer is mistaken in his criticism of Collingwood, and in what follows I shall indicate how it is that Gadamer goes wrong. This is not just a defense of Collingwood because, as I shall also try to show, the very nature of Collingwood’s approach invites Gadamer’s criticism. (shrink)

La notion de dispositif est déterminante dans I’analytique foucaldienne de la société. Et pourtant, son étude demeure négligée par la réception internationale. Après avoir discuté brièvement des difficultés rencontrées avec la traduction du terme de dispositif par Dreyfus et Rabinow dans Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, I’article développe une analytique sociale à partir de la pensée « dispositionelle » de Foucault. L’esquisse de I’histoire du terme de dispositif permettra, en outre, de mieux saisir la pertinence de son usage par Foucault.

La notion de dispositif est déterminante dans I’analytique foucaldienne de la société. Et pourtant, son étude demeure négligée par la réception internationale. Après avoir discuté brièvement des difficultés rencontrées avec la traduction du terme de dispositif par Dreyfus et Rabinow dans Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, I’article développe une analytique sociale à partir de la pensée « dispositionelle » de Foucault. L’esquisse de I’histoire du terme de dispositif permettra, en outre, de mieux saisir la pertinence de son usage par Foucault.

La notion de dispositif est déterminante dans I’analytique foucaldienne de la société. Et pourtant, son étude demeure négligée par la réception internationale. Après avoir discuté brièvement des difficultés rencontrées avec la traduction du terme de dispositif par Dreyfus et Rabinow dans Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, I’article développe une analytique sociale à partir de la pensée « dispositionelle » de Foucault. L’esquisse de I’histoire du terme de dispositif permettra, en outre, de mieux saisir la pertinence de son usage par Foucault.

Examines the implications of recent continental epistemology challenging the relationship between traditional, analytic, continental and postmodern understandings of science, showing that the challenging circumstances of the scientific project are transforming the role and meaning of science in the modern/postmodern world.

I provide a phenomenological response to Quentin Meillassoux’s “realist” criticism of phenomenology and I explore the resources and limits of phenomenology in its own attempt to grapple with the paradox Meillassoux believes sinks it: subjectivity has priority over the physical reality it constitutes despite the anteriority and posteriority of that physical reality to subjectivity. I first offer a corrective to Meillassoux’s interpretation of Husserl. Then, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on the philosophy of nature, where he addresses the paradox by (...) interpreting Husserl in the light of Schelling. I argue throughout that the correct understanding of Husserl’s concept of constitution, and particularly, passive constitution, defangs this realist criticism of phenomenology and suggests phenomenology to be capable of a Naturphilosophie intimating pre-reflective being. The prime instance of this pre-reflective being is subjectivity’s entanglement with a reality that encompasses it. (shrink)

I provide a phenomenological response to Quentin Meillassoux’s “realist” criticism of phenomenology and I explore the resources and limits of phenomenology in its own attempt to grapple with the paradox Meillassoux believes sinks it: subjectivity has priority over the physical reality it constitutes despite the anteriority and posteriority of that physical reality to subjectivity. I first offer a corrective to Meillassoux’s interpretation of Husserl. Then, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on the philosophy of nature, where he addresses the paradox by (...) interpreting Husserl in the light of Schelling. I argue throughout that the correct understanding of Husserl’s concept of constitution, and particularly, passive constitution, defangs this realist criticism of phenomenology and suggests phenomenology to be capable of a Naturphilosophie intimating pre-reflective being. The prime instance of this pre-reflective being is subjectivity’s entanglement with a reality that encompasses it. (shrink)

Daniel, Michael E Review of: Continental ambitions: Roman catholics in North America: The colonial experience, by Kevin Starr, pp. 605, hardback, $59.99.

In her reply to Gershom Scholem’s criticism of Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Hannah Arendt writes.

Since psychiatry remains a descriptive discipline, it is essential for its practitioners to understand how the language of psychiatry came to be formed. This important book, written by a psychiatrist-historian, traces the genesis of the descriptive categories of psychopathology and examines their interaction with the psychological and philosophical context within which they arose. The author explores particularly the language and ideas that have characterised descriptive psychopathology from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. He presents a masterful survey of the (...) history of the main psychiatric symptoms, from the metaphysics of classical antiquity to the operational criteria of today. Tracing the evolution of concepts such as memory, consciousness, will and personality, and of symptoms ranging from catalepsy and aboulia to anxiety and self-harm, this book provides fascinating insights into the subjective nature of mental illness, and into the ideas of British, Continental and American authorities who sought to clarify and define it. (shrink)

A certain familiar but “deep” joke, which might be called “The Tattletale’s Paradox,” embodies a logical confusion that figures crucially in some discussions of substantive philosophical issues. “I can’t tell you the secret,” it runs, “because if I did it wouldn’t be a secret.” It is easy enough to detect the trick involved here: to tell a secret is not to make known a piece of information that is a secret at the time that it is revealed, but rather to (...) tell a story which was a secret but ceases to be one in the telling. The air of paradox arises insofar as we confuse the two claims. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger first adverted to the hermeneutic phenomenological orientation to nature and scientific observation in the scientist's laboratory practice in addition to the scientist's own reflective theoretical expressions. From the start, hermeneutic philosophy of science has focused not only on historical and current scientific texts, including scientific laboratory reports and communications, professional articles, and research protocols, but, even beginning with Heidegger, it has also attended to the scientist's own hermeneutic and phenomenological (that is to say: experimental) interpretation of nature. This (...) includes the hermeneutic phenomenology of scientific observation‐“reading” scientific instruments. For Heidegger, a hermeneutic phenomenology is built into the world of scientific research. The range of approaches to the hermeneutic philosophy of science also includes Joseph Kockelmans’ studies of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, in addition to a range of philosophers of science cutting across the contemporary analytic‐continental divide. (shrink)

Spinoza's writings on metaphysics, ethics, and politics have had a remarkably diverse reception in recent times and have contributed to the current dialogue among philosophers, intellectual historians, and literary theorists.Errol E. Harris has written a brief and simplified introductory presentation of the major branches of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza's ideas are put forward in plain language and supported by convincing argument. Technicalities are either clearly explained or entirely avoided. Professor Harris also shows the student how Spinoza succeeded in reconciling the insights (...) of both the British empiricists and the continental rationalists.Errol E. Harris (Ambleside, Cumbria, England) is John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy (Emeritus) at Northwestern University, and the author of Fundamentals of Philosophy, Spinoza's Philosophy: An Outline, The Substance of Spinoza, The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science, Hypothesis and Perception, Cosmos and Anthropos: A Philosophical Interpretation of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Cosmos and Theos: Ethical and Theological Implications of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, and One World or None: Prescription for Survival. (shrink)

THEODORE KISIEL Date of birth: October 30,1930. Place of birth: Brackenridge, Pennsylvania. Date of institution of highest degree: PhD., Duquesne University, 1962. Academic appointments: University of Dayton; Canisius College; Northwestern University; Duquesne University; Northern Illinois University. I first left the university to pursue a career in metallurgical research and nuclear technology. But I soon found myself drawn back to the uni versity to 'round out' an overly specialized education. It was along this path that I was 'waylaid' into philosophy by (...) teachers like H. L. Van Breda and Bernard Boelen. The philosophy department at Duquesne University was then (1958-1962) a veritable "little Louvain," and the Belgian-Dutch connection exposed me to (among other visiting scholars) Jean Ladriere and Joe Kockelmans, who planted the seeds which eventually led me to the hybrid discipline of a hermeneutics of natural science, and prompted me soon after graduation to make the first of numerous extended visits to Belgium and Germany. The endeavor to learn French and German led me to the task of translating the phenomenological literature bearing especially on natural science and on Heidegger. The talk in the sixties was of a "continental divide" in philosophy between Europe and the Anglo-American world. But in designing my courses in the philosophy of science, I naturally gravitated to the works of Hanson, Kuhn, Polanyi and Toulmin without at first fully realizing why I felt such a strong kinship with them, beyond their common anti positivism. (shrink)

Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...) in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. (shrink)

N'y aurait-il de pas de différence notable entre les philosophies analytique et continentale? La première serait la bonne philosophie, la seconde une philosophie non rigoureuse, de comptoir. Ce jugement est l'apanage des philosophes analytiques, qui considèrent leurs confères de formation continentale, à l'instar de Jacques Derrida, comme des " astrologues ", des non-philosophes. L'auteur approfondit ici le débat, en identifiant de façon rigoureuse les différences importantes qui divisent les deux philosophies.

The book contributes to the refutation of the separation of philosophy in the 20th century into analytic and continental. It is shown that Edmund Husserl was seriously concerned with issues of so-called analytic philosophy, that there are strict parallelisms between Husserl's treatment of philosophical subjects and those of authors in the analytic tradition, and that Husserl had a strong influence on Rudolf Carnap's 'Aufbau'.